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With reference to the discussion about shareholder versus stakeholder maximization it 
is argued that the normal type of maximization is in fact stakeholder-owner maxi-
mization. This means maximization of the sum of the value of the shares and stake-
holder benefits belonging to the dominating stakeholder-owner. Maximization of 
shareholder value is a special case of owner-maximization, and only under quite re-
strictive assumptions shareholder maximization is larger or equal to stakeholder-owner 
maximization. Broad stakeholder maximization is the sum of the returns to all stake-
holders also including the shareholders of a company. Although it may be the ultimate 
goal for Corporate Social Responsibility to achieve this kind of maximization, broad 
stakeholder maximization is quite difficult to give a precise definition. There is no 
one-dimensional measure to add different stakeholder benefits not traded on the mar-
ket, and therefore there is no possibility for practical application. Broad stakeholder 
maximization instead in practical applications becomes satisfying certain stakeholder 
demands, so that the practical application will be stakeholder-owner maximization un-
der constraints defined by other stakeholders’ interests. These constraints vary for dif-
ferent stakeholder owners and new standards for Corporate Social Responsibility and 
more active political consumers will strengthen these constraints. 
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Introduction 
In the 1960’es and 1970’es most companies were seeking Corporate Wealth Maximi-
zation. The firm should fulfill a specter of goals for a broad constituency of interest 
groups (Stonehill and Dullum 1990). In the 1990’es it became common for company 
boards to focus on shareholder value with maximization of the returns to the share-
holders. The recent development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is now 
changing the pendulum back to a broader approach of value-creation for the broad 
group of stakeholders. However, the discussion often lacks clarity about what is really 
meant by the different terms. Based on the analytical stakeholder approach (Mygind 
2001) I will in this paper try to clarify the terms and I will show that shareholder 
maximization is a special case of what can be called stakeholder-owner maximization. 
Broad stakeholder maximization connected to CSR is an ideal form, which can only be 
satisfied under quite strict assumptions. By using the stakeholder approach it is possi-
ble to explain the importance of the identity of the controlling owner also in relation to 
the other stakeholders and the degree of satisfaction of their interests. 
 
The analytical stakeholder approach 
The analytical stakeholder approach1 is introduced to make a distinction from the 
normative stakeholder approach (Evan and Freeman 1983) demanding that all stake-
holders shall take part in the governance and the returns from the company. In con-
trast, the analytical stakeholder approach does not suggest that specific stakeholders 
shall have special rights. The analytical approach simply emphasizes that the analysis 
of enterprise governance must be based on the actual distribution of rights to different 
groups of stakeholders with different interests, resources and abilities in relation to the 
governance of the company (Mygind 2001). An important part of the description of the 
governance structure of a specific company is the distribution on stakeholders of these 
different rights: to control, to the income flows, and to the accumulated wealth. It is 
essential for the analysis, which stakeholder holds the dominating control of the com-
pany, that is, the identity of the dominating owner of the company. In the following I 
will stress the importance of the distinction between the pure owner/ shareholder, with 
no other interests than maximizing the value of the shares and other stakeholder-
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owners, where the specific identity of the stakeholder-owner has strong consequences 
for the maximization function of the company and the returns to other stakeholders. 
Different stakeholders have different attitudes and relations to other stakeholders, and 
therefore not only their evaluation of their own benefits is specific, also their weights 
given to satisfaction of other stakeholders’ interests vary and determine the actual ob-
jective function of the company.2
 
I will first more precisely define shareholder returns and stakeholder returns and then 
apply these terms to the analysis of pure shareholder versus stakeholder-owner maxi-
mization. Then I will contrast owner-maximization with broad stakeholder maximiza-
tion. When are these two types of maximization following each other and when are 
they conflicting? I will stress the problems of measurement of broad stakeholder 
maximization and point to the practical application as owner-maximization under con-
straints given by the relations between the company and the stakeholders. 
 
Shareholder, stakeholder and stakeholder-owner returns 
The value of a company is determined by the return to the stakeholders. The stake-
holders are those involved and affected by the activities of the company (Freeman 
1984). The pure shareholders are the capital providers without other interest than 
maximum return on their shares as future dividends and capital gains given a certain 
level of risk. The returns to shareholders measured as the present capital value are3 V. 
 
The return or benefits to stakeholder, i, in a given company, is denoted as Bi. It is both 
the monetary and non-monetary returns in excess of what the stakeholders are willing 
to accept given the alternatives from other companies. This is the extra benefit the firm 
transfers to the stakeholders compared to a situation where the firm did not exist. Thus, 
these benefits do not include the remuneration they could get in the best alternative.  
 
For consumers of a whole industry with a homogenous product the consumer-surplus 
in the traditional supply and demand scheme can be used as an illustration. The de-
mand curve indicates the utility of the consumers, that is, what they are willing to pay 
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at different quantities offered. The part of the demand curve lying over the market 
price indicates that some consumers are willing to pay more than the ruling price for a 
certain number of products. If we assume that there is no price-discrimination this free 
value can be taken as stakeholder benefits to the consumers, who get the goods at a 
lower price than they are willing to accept.   
 
Figure 1 gives a parallel example of returns to the employee stakeholders: A certain 
company attracts a group of employee, who for simplicity can be assumed to be ho-
mogenous seen from the point of view of the company. The company will offer the 
same wage and working conditions for each of these employees. To attract them the 
company must pay a competitive wage and offer competitive working conditions. 
However, the employees are differently attracted to the company because their situa-
tions and their preferences vary. They have different transportation costs, different atti-
tudes to the company – e.g. some workers may have family connections to the com-
pany, and some have special preferences for the company’s specific employee-policy 
etc. Therefore, some of the employees are in fact willing to work for the company at a 
lower price. This price is the transfer earning subjectively determined by each em-
ployee. In figure 1 it is starting with the lowest to the left and then increasing for each 
extra worker. Depending on the specific technology in the company each additional 
worker has a certain marginal value product of labor, which is assumed to fall from a 
certain input level. It will pay off for the company to hire additional workers up till the 
point where the transfer earning curve and the MVPL-curve intersect. At this point the 
firm will pay the wage, W, which is just enough to attract the last employed worker. 
The wage can be assumed to include all the variable average labor costs. For a given 
worker the economic rent, that is, the difference between the transfer earnings and the 
wage makes up the net private benefits or the individual employee stakeholder bene-
fits. The size of these benefits is the subjective measure by each employee. The area 
between the wage-line and the curve is the total employee stakeholder benefits and the 
area over the wage-line limited by the MVPL-curve is the surplus to the company. 
 
A high level of net private benefits, on Figure 1 employee stakeholder benefits, indi-
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cates that the company gives a relatively high wage and/or has relatively favorable 
working conditions compared with other companies. The figure can illustrate effi-
ciency wage setting ((Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) by an upward move in the wage-line. 
An efficiency wage (and “efficiecy working conditions”) not only result in high bene-
fits for the employee. To secure these benefits the employees may work harder, have 
lower turnover etc. resulting in an upward shift in the level of MPVL. Following this 
policy the firm may continue to increase the wage and improve the working conditions 
as long as the corresponding increase in MVPL continues to increase the total surplus, 
and such a movement will both increase the surplus and the stakeholder benefits. 
 
Figure 1 can also illustrates the importance of relation specific investments: Assume 
that the employees through special training programs build up their specific human 
capital connected to the company. This increases their productivity and may lead to a 
wage increase. The transfer earnings will not increase since the upgrading of skills is 
specific to the current company. Therefore, the net stakeholder benefits also increases.  
 
Since the transfer-earnings are based on the existing best alternative for the employees, 
the stakeholder benefits also indicate the loss for the employees if the company closed 
down. In this way the stakeholder value is a measure of the importance for the em-
ployees of the continuation of the company and their employment contract. The risk of 
unemployment is included in the estimation of the transfer earnings. 
 
The stakeholder returns also include negative effects on stakeholders such as pollution 
affecting the surrounding community. The general public can be taken as the supplier 
of the company’s “license to operate”. In return the society gets tax revenues and a 
specter of positive externalities such as employment, technological spillovers, self-
enforcing clusters for economic development etc, but possibly also negative external-
ities in the form of pollution and health risks of the employees. If the price for the li-
cense to operate is zero the net-benefits are simply the sum of the benefits minus the 
costs estimated by all the persons affected by the externalities.  To clarify the terms I 
give some examples of returns to different stakeholders in table 1 and 2. 
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Table 1: General stakeholder and stakeholder-owner benefits 
stakeholder benefits stakeholder-owner benefits - costs 
net-benefits in excess 
of remuneration/price 
necessary for the 
stakeholders to go into 
contract with company 
The owner can fulfill specific stakeholder-owner preferences: 
self-governance, secure stakeholder benefits 
avoid hold up problems for relation-specific investments, 
strengthen position in negotiations with firm as counterpart, 
appropriating rights from minority shareholders, 
Cost of ownership: risk concentration, decision making costs 
for groups of owners, activity outside core competence 
 
Table 2: Examples of stakeholder benefits  
 stakeholder benefits:  Bi stakeholder-owner benefits:BOi
manager some self-governance 
prestige (size of company etc.)  
fringe benefits, career-
opportunities  
full self-governance  
secure specific human capital 
- costs of ownership: risk-
concentration 
employees return on specific human capital 
wage, safety, quality of work-
place, self-governance, training 
higher than transfer earnings 
(no wage-discrimination) 
self-governance (restricted by 
group majority) 
secure specific human capital 
- costs of ownership: risk-concen-




higher price, stability 
(lower price, stability) 
no hold up problem = secure rela-
tion-specific investments 
- costs of ownership, activity out-
side core competences 
consumer better quality, lower price than 
willing to accept (consumer 
surplus, no price discrimination)
stable deliveries 
avoid monopoly-pricing 
- costs of ownership: risk-concen-
tration, costs of decision making 
creditor higher security than necessary 
(better information, lower risk) 
full inside information 
- costs of ownership, activity out-
side core competences 
community 
local/national 
higher tax, employment, local 
activity, technological spill-
overs (compared to no activity)  
net benefits of externalities: 
health, education, pollution,  
problems of measurement and  
conflicting preferences 





What is the background for these stakeholder benefits? Why does the owner of the 
company not incorporate these benefits by price- and wage-discrimination and pres-
sing down the worker related costs? The answers lie in specific investment, transaction 
costs, and efficiency wages.  
 
Specific investments done by the suppliers to the advantage of both the company and 
the supplier – e.g. payment for employees’ investment in specific human capital – 
mean often an addition to the wage-level. Since this investment is relation-specific the 
return is not included in the normal market remuneration and there is no market out-
side the company to determine the exact level. Therefore, the division of the return is 
determined in the negotiations between the owner and the specific stakeholder – a 
game of reciprocal monopoly - and it can be expected that part of the benefits will go 
to the employees. 
 
High transaction costs in relation to price- and wage-discrimination and e.g. in relation 
to determining the negative effects of externalities like pollution or positive effect of 
higher health standards is another explanation why some stakeholder benefits are not 
tradable and included in the shareholder value. Although the different rights are speci-
fied the Coase-theorem does not apply when high transaction costs make it impossible 
to internalize the externalities. However, state regulation is often used to overcome the 
problems of externalities. The state represents the broad group of diversified stake-
holders and state regulation overcomes the problem of transaction costs in relation to 
specifying and enforcing the contract between the company and this broad group of 
stakeholders. 
 
The tables also include stakeholder-owner benefits, noted as BOi. Stakeholder-owners 
are stakeholders who control the firm through ownership. As owners they supply the 
company with certain resources such as their ability to govern the enterprise and moni-
tor the manager. The owners may also supply critical resources like risk-capital entre-
preneurship, networks etc. Because of high transaction costs they will only supply 
these resources in combination with ownership. Therefore, the total value produced by 
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the company depends on the identity of the owner. At the same time the owners can 
govern the company in a direction, which maximizes the satisfaction of their own 
preferences.  
 
The tables give some examples of these special owner-benefits connected to control-
ling the firm: Through ownership the stakeholder-owner can get benefits, which could 
not be included in a market contract between the stakeholder and the firm (Hart 1995). 
Manager- or employee-owners can fulfill goals of self-governance. For the group of 
employees, this will be restricted by the necessity to follow the majority within the 
group of employee-owners. Being the owner a certain stakeholder gets a strong posi-
tion in securing the specific investments related to the firms’ activities. This is the case 
for all the stakeholders connected directly to the firm’s value chain as suppliers or cus-
tomers. The higher the net-benefits the more interested the stakeholders will be in the 
continuation of their specific relationship, and the best guarantee will often be direct 
control through ownership of the company.  
 
The owners strengthen their position both in relation to the firm and in relation to other 
stakeholders in the negotiations for the remuneration on their specific investments in 
the firm. Employee-owners will not only secure their specific investments, but proba-
bly also get a higher remuneration in return for their specific investment. At the same 
time the distribution of benefits for other stakeholders can in most cases be expected to 
change. This happens both because of a change in the owners’ preferences and a 
change in the negotiating positions between the new owner and the different stake-
holders. The owner-benefits are not only connected to a stronger position in the game 
of distribution of some of the stakeholder benefits. It can also include the possibility of 
appropriating owner returns from non-controlling owners (minority shareholders).  
 
There are also costs of being owner. These costs are first of all related to risk concen-
tration, a problem which is especially important for managers and employees investing 
both their jobs and their capital in the same company. For employee ownership the 
costs of decision-making in the group of employee owners may be quite high, espe-
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cially if the group of employee owners is quite heterogeneous with conflicting interests 
(Hansman 1988).  The cost-side can also include the costs for e.g. a supplier of going 
into the owner-role in a business outside the core competence of the supplier firm.  
 
Shareholder versus stakeholder-owner maximization 
Now the different types of maximization can be defined. We will first divide the 
owner-maximization in stakeholder-owner maximization and the special form of  
 
maximum shareholder value = Vmax
 
This is the value of the company seen from the point of view of the pure shareholder 
without other stakeholder interest than maximizing return on the share-capital. But 
also other stakeholders’ can be owners of the company and the identity of the dominat-
ing stakeholder is crucial. The different stakeholders have different goals and different 
skills for directly managing the company or governing the manager and different inter-
ests and abilities to appropriate part of the surplus. Therefore, the share-value, V, and 
the benefits of the different stakeholders vary with the type of the controlling stake-
holder indicated by the subscript j, below. Maximization for stakeholder-owner, j, 
owning a proportion, a, of the company, is4:  
 
max (aVj + BOj + Bj).  
 
Vj  is often lower than Vmax. because the stakeholder-owner appropriates returns from 
the other shareholders. On the other hand, the specific stakeholder may have some ad-
vantages, better information, networks, different forms of synergies, so that the total 
productivity increases. However, most of this increase will probably go directly into 
the pockets of the stakeholder-owner.  
 
Assume the company initially is following a pure shareholder maximization strategy 
and the share-value has reached the maximum level on the market, Vmax. Stakeholder j 
gets Bj in stakeholder benefits, and we assume that this investor gets the same stake-
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holder benefits after a takeover. On top of this the investor gets the stakeholder-owner 
benefits of BOj. The investor pays the current market price for the necessary share of 
ownership aVmax. Stakeholder, j, have an incentive to take over the firm if:    
 
aVmax + Bj <  (aVj + BOj + Bj) => a (Vmax - Vj) < BOj   
 
The stakeholder, j, will take over the company paying the value of the shares aVmax if 
the private benefits are larger than the fall in value of the shares owned by this new 
stakeholder-owner.  There may be a governance problem seen from the point of view 
of the minority owners. The controlling owner takes all the stakeholder-owner benefits 
although he owns less than 100% of the shares. The minority shareholders, who own 
(1-a) of the company have a loss of (1-a)(Vmax-Vj ). To protect the minority-share-
holders it can by mandatory bid be obliged for the new majority owner to buy not only 
the proportion a, but in principle all shares at the agreed price. For a = 1 the value for 
the stakeholder-owner must be higher than the shareholder-maximization value.   
 
Vmax <  Vj + BOj   
 
Stakeholder-owner maximization is seen from the point of view of the specific stake-
holder. There will be some situations where shareholder maximization is highest and 
some, where stakeholder-owner maximization is higher. In a perfect market the iden-
tity of the owner will not be important, because all the possible benefits for the stake-
holder-owner can be contracted with the company. The manager will not want to take 
over the ownership when all the benefits can be included in the manager contract. 
From the point of view of the pure owners it will pay off to give special benefits to the 
manager, if it improves the performance of the company. In this case shareholder 
maximization will be higher than stakeholder-owner maximization. But if it is not pos-
sible to make this kind of contract because of high transaction costs of specifying and 
controlling the benefits and contributions stakeholder-owner maximization may ex-
ceed the maximum shareholder value. Therefore, the company seen from a certain 
stakeholder will have a higher value than pure shareholder maximization.  
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 What is the possibility for the share market or the market for control of unlisted com-
panies to include the stakeholder-owner returns in the valuation? Only under quite re-
stricted circumstances this may be possible. If the market is informed about the possi-
bility of these stakeholder-owner returns it may to some extent be built into the share 
price. This will not be the case if the stakeholder takeover is unexpected, but if the 
general type of ownership in the specific industry is ownership by a specific type of 
stakeholders there will be formed a market price for these specific stakeholder benefits 
like in the farming case given below: 
 
Assume that a group of employees has strong stakeholder benefits because of self-
governance and securing their specific human capital. At the same time ownership can 
function as an effective motivation tool for the employees and the costs of ownership 
in relation to collective decision making are relatively low. Assume also that the exist-
ing owners cannot make a contract, which includes these benefits without de facto giv-
ing up their ownership rights. The employees are willing (and able5) to buy the shares 
for a higher price than the market value for pure shareholders as reflected on the share 
market. The maximization of stakeholder-owner value implies that the insiders take 
over a dominating share and take control over the company. The takeover may imply 
that some of the returns on the shares are directly transferred to returns on labor. This 
means that if some outsiders still have shares left, they may lose value. In this way the 
controlling owners have appropriated rights from the minority owners.  
 
Another case is family farming  (Mygind 1992). Large scale farming through external 
ownership may be more efficient from a narrow economic point of view, but such a 
view does not include the satisfaction a farmer gets by being his own master. In other 
words, the individual farmer may sacrifice some income and/or deliver a higher effort 
because he is governing himself compared to the situation where he is a wage-earner 
in a large farm. These benefits are in many cases not possible to contract between the 
farmer and an external owner, because the farmer cannot get enough self-governance 
without actually taking over most of the ownership rights6. The positive value of the 
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self-governance benefits most often exceeds the costs of smaller scale, so stakeholder-
owner value in this way exceeds the shareholder value. Family farms are at the same 
time an example where the actual market value of ownership includes the stakeholder-
owner benefits because family farms are so widespread. 
 
A strategic investor, which in some way is linked to the value chain of the target com-
pany (supplier, customer, competitor), may want to take over the company, because 
synergy effects can improve the total profit of the two companies. In this way there are 
stakeholder-owner benefits to the strategic investor. These values are not reflected in 
the shareholder value of the target company before the deal is made public. Therefore, 
this is another example of stakeholder-owner maximization. However, if both compa-
nies are listed on the stock exchange the deal may in fact increase the total shareholder 
value of the combined companies, and in this sense the acquisition can be taken as an 
activity to increase pure shareholder value7. Even if the companies are not listed. If the 
acquisition increases the total value seen from the point of view of the pure owners, we 
can still talk about shareholder maximization. 
 
The general public may get higher net-benefits if the state owns and operates e.g. a 
hospital. In this case the net-benefits (total benefits - transaction costs - other costs) are 
higher for the state than private ownership. However, these benefits must be evaluated 
by a political measure stick, where equality, public health considerations, the value of 
prolonging life, the negative effects of taxation etc. will be rated differently depending 
on the dominant political attitudes. In some countries the stakeholder-owner benefits 
of the general public will be valued so high that the state will take over the company, 
while in other countries a similar company will be run by a private company if the 
public owner-benefits here get a lower rating. 
 
In general we can talk about owner-maximization. The identity of the controlling 
owner has strong impact both on performance, on the returns to the owners, and on the 
benefits to other stakeholders. In this respect the shareholder maximization by the pure 
owner without specific stakeholder interests can be taken as a special case of owner-
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maximization. Pure shareholder maximization is relevant when the specific stake-
holder-owner benefits are non-existing or lower than the corresponding fall in share-
holder value. But if the total value is higher with stakeholder-owner takeover, maximi-
zation implies a takeover by the stakeholder-owner who is willing to pay the highest 
price. This is the stakeholder who gets the highest return from a takeover. The take-
over price will be equal to or most often lower than the total stakeholder-owner value, 
since the stakeholder owner will not pay more than necessary for the takeover. 
 
Broad stakeholder maximization 
The total value of the firm including all the stakeholders, the shareholders as well as 
the stakeholder owner is: 
 
Total stakeholder value = Vj + BOj + SUMiBij
 
The j specifies that both the share value and the benefits to different stakeholders de-
pend on the identity of the stakeholder controlling the firm. The summation over the 
i’es assures that all the different stakeholders’ benefits are included. 
 
As indicated in table 2, there are strong measurement problems concerning the stake-
holder benefits. It can be argued that these problems make the term meaningless (Jen-
sen 2001). When we have stakeholder-owner maximization we have only one set of 
private benefits, and it can be assumed, that these benefits are measured subjectively 
by the specific stakeholder-owner. The owner calculates the value of controlling own-
ership seen from stakeholder-owner point of view. The specific stakeholder-owner can 
in this way make the exact decision about the weight between current and future in-
come, between financial returns and e.g. the value of self-governance etc. The stake-
holder-owner has a specific subjective measurement stick to bring different dimen-
sions of the objective function down to one dimension. This one-dimensionality is 
necessary to give a precise meaning of the term maximization, and to decide whether 
one decision is better than an alternative decision (Jensen 2001).  
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One-dimensionality is not possible to establish for the non-owner stakeholders’ bene-
fits, because these benefits are typically not traded and compensated directly over the 
market, but based on subjective evaluations. Market based contracts with the different 
stakeholders cover only the transfer price of the transactions, not their rents. The mul-
tiple dimensions raise the traditional problem in economics about the impossibility of 
comparing utility between different individuals.  
 
To the extent that the owner maximizes both the owner-value and the broad stake-
holder value at the same time there are no problems with multi-dimensionality. Ac-
cording to Jensen (2001) this is in fact the case because the owners’ maximization of 
the market value also means that the stakeholder values are maximized. The basic as-
sumption is that all the contracts, which are mutually favorable for the company and 
the different stakeholders, are implemented in the process of owner-maximization. 
This is the case in figure 1. Both the net-benefits of the employee stakeholders and the 
surplus of the company are maximized at the chosen wage and employment level. 
 
The use of efficiency wage setting and employee participation are examples of mutu-
ally maximization of owner value and broad stakeholder value. Higher wages and em-
ployee participation give returns to the company because of higher motivation, more 
creativity, higher productivity, lower turnover, easier recruitment of high quality labor 
etc. We have again a win-win situation with both an increase in the owner value and in 
the benefits for the stakeholders. 
 
However, often owner-maximization does not lead to broad stakeholder maximization. 
We could have a zero-sum game situation where the owner increases the owner-value 
by cutting the benefits of the stakeholders. An example could be price-discrimination 
transferring some of the consumer surplus to the company, or it could be wage dis-
crimination. In Figure 1 this would mean that a group of workers with the lowest trans-
fer earnings got the lowest wage, a middle group got mid-level wages and only the 
marginal group of employees got the wage shown in figure 1. In this way the owner 
can transfer part of the employee-benefits to the surplus.  
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 A decrease in the price of medicine for developing countries can be understood as an 
example of a social responsibility fulfilling the stakeholder interest of the populations 
in poor countries. However it can also be taken as a price-discrimination strategy to 
exploit the segments of the market with low purchasing power and still making a profit 
for the company8. On top of this the company can use the gift-element in the promo-
tion to improve its reputation. 
 
It can be argued that the zero sum game is just a matter of the distribution of the cake, 
and still the total cake and thus the total return to all stakeholders is maximized. How-
ever, because of the problem of multi-dimensionality the benefits to specific stake-
holder cannot be compared, so we cannot say that one stakeholder’s appropriation of 
benefits from another stakeholder is neutral. 
 
Often the game between different stakeholder groups does not only lead to a change in 
the distribution of rents. The result can be a minus game, where the redistribution leads 
to a decrease in the size of the cake. A monopoly situation is a classical example 
where profit-maximization means that the monopoly restricts production and increases 
prices, so that there will be a loss of the consumer surplus and in general a deadweight 
loss for the society. Similarly in figure 1 the firm could get a higher profit by lowering 
wages and restrict production. The surplus would increase, but the benefits to employ-
ees would fall even further. There is again a deadweight loss to society, and no straight 
forward path of negotiations to reach the optimal production level.  
 
In relation to externalities the profit-maximizing company has an interest in hiding the 
negative effects and seeking compensation for the positive effects9. High transaction 
costs often mean that is it not possible to make mutual improvements for the involved 
stakeholders. This situation calls for state regulation to strengthen the positive and 
limit the negative externalities. 
 
There are cases where narrow owner maximization is in line with satisfaction of the 
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needs of other stakeholders e.g. consumers, but there will also be cases with conflict-
ing interests with trade-offs between different stakeholders’ benefits. Even within a 
stakeholder group, such as the group affected by different externalities from a com-
pany there will be high variation in the valuation of the effects e.g. the uncertainty 
connected to possible negative effects on the environment and positive effects of fu-
ture employment possibilities caused by the company.  
 
Who shall decide the exact trade-off function to assign the weights to these diverging 
interests? In most cases the owner in control of the company will make these choices 
combined with some state regulations. The maximization problem may be solved by 
the owner maximizing his own utility function given a vector of restrictions deter-
mined by the owners’ relation to these other stakeholders and state regulation. These 
constraints can be assumed to vary between different types of stakeholder-owners: A 
large well known multinational company with a strong established brand can be ex-
pected to be very sensitive to the reputation in relation to negative information about 
pollution, mistreatment of the labor-force, negative health impact of the products or 
production processes etc. The sensitivity depends e.g. on the degree of information and 
reactions by “political consumers”. Compare with a small focused firm, which does 
not have much reputational capital to lose. Such a company will pay less attention to 
stakeholder interests compared to the high profile MNC. An analytical stakeholder ap-
proach must, therefore, in the analysis include the specific stakeholder-owner objec-
tives and the stakeholder-owners relation to other stakeholders. This means that not 
only the stakeholder owners’ objective function will vary. The restrictions on this 
maximization in relation to other stakeholders will vary too. 
 
On top of the share-value and the benefits for the stakeholder-owner, broad stake-
holder maximization includes all the benefits of the other stakeholders. If we have 
owner maximization we can assume that the owners have already contracted all the 
contractible benefits and turned them into value for the owners. The restrictions made 
by legislation, codes and standards and pressure from organized groups, which can af-
fect the reputation and thus the returns to the company may turn the company away 
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from some of the activities, which diminish the returns to other stakeholders. An activ-
ity which is not profitable from a narrow profit-maximization point of view, but which 
is profitable from a broader point including benefits for other stakeholders, may turn 
out to be profitable for the company when it considers its reputational value. In this 
way legislation and pressure from organized groups can imply an increase in the area 
for win-win situations where both owners’ value and other stakeholders’ value move 
in the same direction.  
 
To increase the area for win-win situations it is important that the company gets credits 
for the activities with positive impact for the stakeholders, but to develop long run 
credibility the company shall also be transparent about the possible negative stake-
holder effects. The company shall strive for transparency and give timely, detailed and 
accurate information about the company’s activities and the estimated effects of these 
activities on different groups. This means that in addition to the normal shareholder-
oriented financial information, the company should make estimates for the effects for 
the employees (wage, employment, training, safety etc), the effects on consumers and 
society (pollution, carbondioxide-balance, health implications, tax etc.). At the same 
time the company shall open up for stakeholder inputs by including different stake-
holder groups in the discussion about the company’s activities.  
 
Conclusion  
In the 1990’es the tendency has been to focus on quite narrow shareholder maximiza-
tion, but with the resent introduction of Corporate Social Responsibility broad stake-
holder maximization has again been an important part of the agenda. In this content it 
is relevant more precisely to define shareholder and stakeholder values.  
 
In the discussion on maximization the neoliberal camp argues that profit-maximization 
in the companies lead to the best results and market contracting also fulfills the needs 
of other stakeholders. On the other side we have the normative stakeholder approach 
stating that all stakeholders shall be involved in the governance of the companies 
without stating more exact procedures for how this should be done. In this paper the 
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starting point is the analytical stakeholder approach emphasizing that the analysis of 
governance of companies must include the distribution on different stakeholders of 
different interests, resources and rights in relation to the company. This approach is the 
analytical tool for understanding the governance structure and the background for the 
different maximization strategies. 
 
The stakeholder-identity of the dominating owner is crucial. We distinguish between 
two types of owner-maximization: pure shareholder-maximization and stakeholder-
owner maximization. The latter includes stakeholder benefits defined from the princi-
ples of economic rent. If in a certain transaction the stakeholder supplier (buyer) gets a 
price that is higher (lower) than what is necessary for the stakeholder to go into the 
transaction there will be a net-benefit left for the stakeholders. The net benefits of ex-
ternalities are simply the sum of the benefits minus the costs estimated by all the per-
sons affected by the externalities. 
 
The stakeholder-owner has specific resources and interests, which is important both 
for the economic performance of the enterprise and for the distribution of stakeholder 
benefits. Through ownership the stakeholder-owners can secure their company specific 
stakeholder benefits. They can also get a higher share of the benefits in the distribu-
tion-game with other stakeholders including minority shareholders. The stakeholder-
owner who has the greatest advantage of ownership compared to ordinary market ex-
change will pay the highest price for ownership and control the stakeholder-owner 
maximization of the company.  
 
Pure shareholder-maximization is a special case of owner-maximization where only 
the pure owner interest as supplier of risk-capital is behind the maximization. Other 
stakeholder-owners include on top of the interest as supplier of capital also specific 
stakeholder-interests as supplier, buyer, resident in the area etc. The value seen from 
the point of view of the pure shareholder owner will be the highest when market im-
perfections, relation specific investments and transaction costs are so low that the po-
tential stakeholder-owners satisfy their interests best through ordinary market transac-
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tions. In this case the stakeholder-owner benefits are quite low, and cannot cover the 
fall in shareholder value, which is often following a takeover, which implies a change 
from pure-shareholder maximization to stakeholder-owner maximization.  
 
Broad stakeholder maximization includes the benefits for all groups – pure sharehol-
ders as well as all other stakeholders. This covers the shareholder value, the value for 
the stakeholder owner, and the value for other stakeholders. There is a precise measure 
for broad stakeholder maximization only under the restrictive condition that there are 
no trade-offs between the benefits of the different stakeholders. When there are trade-
offs it is necessary with a measure stick to transfer the different benefits to one dimen-
sion.  
 
Under perfect market conditions the maximization of owners’ value coincides with 
broad stakeholder maximization because the different stakeholders go into transactions 
with the company only when they are mutually beneficial. However, in case of imper-
fect competition, externalities, and high transaction costs, the interests of the dominant 
owner to a high degree determine the distribution of benefits on the different groups. 
In case of trade-offs the objective function will be determined by the dominant owner. 
This happens in interaction with the market and the other stakeholders. Thus, in prac-
tice even in companies influenced by Corporate Social Responsibility, we will not find 
broad stakeholder maximization. Instead we will have stakeholder-owner maximiza-
tion (with shareholder maximization as a special case) with constraints given by the 
interests of different stakeholder groups including the public interest represented by 
the state and enforced through different types of regulation. 
 
The tighter these constraints, the more the dominant owner will have to consider other 
stakeholder interests, and the larger the outcome area where owner-maximization and 
stakeholder maximization are following each other. State legislation, new standards for 
Corporate Social Responsibility and active “political consumers” can strengthen these 
constraints. Legislation only covering one country can undermine the competitiveness 
of local companies. Therefore, it must be implemented within regional trading-areas or 
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even better globally. In fact, globalization and building up global brand-names make 
MNCs accountable all over the world and more sensitive to strong movements of po-
litical consumers. The development of international standards for treatment of work-
ers, environment, human rights etc. both through legislation, international cooperation, 
and globally organized pressure groups makes it possible that market based decision-
making based on owners’ maximization also includes strong considerations for other 
stakeholders by including their interests as constraints to the maximization procedures. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In their distinction between normative, instrumental and descriptive Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) would probably categorize the analytical approach in their last category. 
 
2 How the identity of the stakeholders determine the objective functions of the company is an 
important topic in the governance literature (see Fama and Jensen 1985 and Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997), and especially the role of the manager as agent for several stakeholder princi-
pals have been discussed in the stakeholder literature (Hill and Jones 1992 and Mitchell et al 
1997). 
 
3 The company does not need to be listed on the stock-exchange. The idea is that the share 
value on the stock exchange reflects the expected returns for the pure shareholders, or alterna-
tively that the market for control of unlisted companies reflects the value seen from the point 
of view of the pure owner.  
 
4 The value is the present value of the expected future net-benefits, so we do not distinguish 
between flows and stocks. 
 
5 Special credit constraints for employees on imperfect capital markets may mean that the em-
ployees cannot implement even a value-creating takeover. 
 
6 Special quite specified leasing contracts modify this conclusion, but usually such contracts 
are long-term and come close to de facto ownership. 
 
7 Empirical evidence shows that most often the shareholders of the target company gets most 
of the benefits (Jensen and Ruback 1983), but the actual distribution of the shareholder value 
is not important in this content.   
 
8 This is possible if the starting point is monopoly where the price is higher than the marginal 
costs. It means that production will increase and part of the deadweight loss will be trans-
formed to profit and consumer surplus. We assume, it is possible to make price-discrimina-
tion, and therefore the price and profit on the existing market is not lowered. 
 
9 Jensen 2001 stresses that short run profit maximization may hamper the long run cooperation 
with the stakeholders and therefore it will not be in accordance with value maximization. 
With his “enlightened maximization” Jensen therefore emphasizes long run considerations in 
the relations with the different stakeholders. At the same time he recognizes that externalities 
and monopoly can break the connection between owner-maximization and maximization of 
the stakeholders interests. Therefore, state-regulation has an important role to adjust for these 
imperfections. 
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